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Exchange-Rate Misalignments in Duopoly: The Case of Airbus and Boeing


Lionel Fontagne


University of Paris - Paris School of Economics; European University Institute - Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (RSCAS); Banque de France; CEPII

Agnès Bénassy-Quéré


Paris School of Economics (University Paris 1)

Horst Raff


Christian-Albrechts-Universitaet zu Kiel; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research); Kiel Institute for the World Economy

February 9, 2009


Abstract:     
We examine the effect of exchange-rate misalignments on competition in the market for large commercial aircraft. This market is a duopoly where players compete in dollar-denominated prices while one of them, Airbus, incurs costs mostly in euros. We construct and calibrate a simulation model to investigate how companies adjust their prices to deal with the effects of a temporary misalignment, and how this affects profit margins and volumes. We also explore the effects on the long-run dynamics of competition. We conclude that, due to the duopolistic nature of the aircraft market, Airbus will pass only a small part of the exchange-rate fluctuations on to customers through higher prices. Moreover, due to features specific to the aircraft industry, such as customer switching costs and learning-by-doing, even a temporary departure of the exchange rate from its long-run equilibrium level may have permanent effects on the industry.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 24

Keywords: Exchange-rate pass-through, duopoly, aircraft industry

JEL Classification: F31, D43, L11, L62

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Date posted: March 9, 2012  

Suggested Citation

Fontagne, Lionel, Bénassy-Quéré, Agnès and Raff, Horst, Exchange-Rate Misalignments in Duopoly: The Case of Airbus and Boeing (February 9, 2009). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2018852 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2018852

Contact Information

Lionel Fontagne (Contact Author)
University of Paris - Paris School of Economics ( email )
Maison des Sciences Economiques
106-112 Bd de l'Hôpital
Paris 75013
France
+33 1 44 07 83 37 (Phone)
+33 1 53 68 55 01 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://lionel.fontagne.free.fr
European University Institute - Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (RSCAS) ( email )
Via dei Roccettini 9
via delle Fontanelle 10
50016 San Domenico di Fiesole, Florence 50014
Italy
Banque de France ( email )
Paris
France
CEPII ( email )
9 Rue Georges Pitard
Paris 75015
France
+33 1 53 68 55 23 (Phone)
+33 1 53 68 55 01 (Fax)
Agnes Benassy-Quere
Paris School of Economics (University Paris 1) ( email )
106-112 boulevard de l'Hopital
Paris, F-75013
France
+33 1 44 07 82 19 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://www.parisschoolofeconomics.com/benassy-quere-agnes/agnesb.html
Horst Raff
Christian-Albrechts-Universitaet zu Kiel ( email )
Institut fur Volkswirtschaftslehre
Wilhelm-Seelig-Platz 1
Kiel, 24098
Germany
+49-431-880-1582 (Phone)
+49-431-880-3150 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.wiso.uni-kiel.de/vwlinstitute/Raff/?page=raff
CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research)
Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany
Kiel Institute for the World Economy ( email )
P.O. Box 4309
Kiel, D-24100
Germany
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


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