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Adverse Selection and Partial Exclusive DealingJustin P. JohnsonCornell University - Samuel Curtis Johnson Graduate School of Management February 13, 2012 Abstract: I reconcile a disagreement in the literature regarding the impact of downstream price competition on anti-competitive exclusive dealing, and then extend the exclusive dealing literature to accommodate adverse selection. Adverse selection expands the scope of inefficient exclusion, and may also explain policies of partial exclusion, in which an incumbent prots by locking up select retailers even though the entrant's product is still competitively supplied in equilibrium. I relate my results to recent antitrust cases against Intel.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 35 Keywords: Exclusive Dealing, Partial Exclusion, Intel JEL Classification: K21, L4, L11 working papers seriesDate posted: March 11, 2012Suggested CitationContact Information
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