Abstract

 


 



Bank Delays in the Resolution of Delinquent Mortgages: The Problem of Limbo Loans


Linda Allen


Baruch College, CUNY - Zicklin School of Business

Stavros Peristiani


Federal Reserve Bank of New York

Yi Tang


Fordham University - School of Business

June 2013

Fordham University Schools of Business Research Paper No. 2018948

Abstract:     
Limbo loans are defined as delinquent mortgage loans that have not progressed either to foreclosure (non-foreclosure limbo) or to resolution (foreclosure limbo). We find that 21.79% (representing $24.8 billion in principal) of the subprime loans originated in Florida during 2004-2008 were in limbo as of December 2010. We utilize a unique legal docket database and find no support for either bottlenecks or bank capital constraints as explanations for the limbo loan phenomenon. Rather we find support for an operational risk hypothesis in which the impairment of property rights contributes to both the likelihood that a loan will remain in limbo and the length of time spent in limbo. In particular, we find that the presence of the Mortgage Electronic Registration System (MERS) in both assignment and foreclosures significantly increases both the likelihood and severity of the time spent in limbo, such that a 10% increase in the presence of MERS in county foreclosures and assignments adds around 8 months (3.5 months) to the time spent in foreclosure limbo (non-foreclosure limbo). Lost documentation affidavits are found to be required to replace lost property rights so as to move these loans to resolution more quickly.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 65

Keywords: Mortgage, MERS, foreclosure

JEL Classification: G21, G28

working papers series


Download This Paper

Date posted: March 11, 2012 ; Last revised: June 1, 2013

Suggested Citation

Allen, Linda, Peristiani, Stavros and Tang, Yi, Bank Delays in the Resolution of Delinquent Mortgages: The Problem of Limbo Loans (June 2013). Fordham University Schools of Business Research Paper No. 2018948. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2018948 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2018948

Contact Information

Linda Allen (Contact Author)
Baruch College, CUNY - Zicklin School of Business ( email )
17 Lexington Avenue
New York, NY 10010
United States
646-312-3463 (Phone)
646-312-3451 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://stern.nyu.edu/~lallen
Stavros Peristiani
Federal Reserve Bank of New York ( email )
33 Liberty Street
New York, NY 10045
United States
212-720-7829 (Phone)
Yi Tang
Fordham University - School of Business ( email )
113 West 60th Street
Bronx, NY 10458
United States

Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 528
Downloads: 81
Download Rank: 156,765

© 2013 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright
This page was processed by apollo7 in 0.360 seconds