Cartel Federalism? Antitrust Enforcement by State Attorneys General
George Mason University School of Law; American Enterprise Institute (AEI)
University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 72, p. 99, 2005
Largely in connection with the Microsoft litigation, the antitrust enforcement authority of state attorneys general, in their parens patriae capacity, has generated acrimonious debate. Perhaps the only point of genuine agreement is the complaint over the lack of reliable empirical evidence on state antitrust enforcement. This Essay attempts to make a modest contribution to the data front and a more ambitious and provocative contribution to the theoretical debate.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 25
Keywords: Microsoft litigation, cartel federalism, state attorney generalAccepted Paper Series
Date posted: March 11, 2012 ; Last revised: November 2, 2012
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