Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2019378
 


 



Lobbying: Buying and Utilizing Access


Wolfgang Mayer


University of Cincinnati - McMicken College of Arts and Sciences - Department of Economics

Sudesh Mujumdar


affiliation not provided to SSRN

2012

Economics Discussion Paper No. 2012-15

Abstract:     
This paper introduces an alternative to the lobbying literature's standard assumption that money buys policies. Our model - in which influence-seeking requires both money to buy access and managerial time to utilize access - offers three significant benefits. First, it counters criticism that the money-buys-policies assumption is at odds with reality. Second, its much stronger lobbying incentives weaken the free-rider problem and raise incentives for lobby formation. Third, the model yields testable hypotheses on: the determinants of lobbying incentives; the number of lobbying firms in an industry; and the impact on industry lobbying by the size distribution of firms, contribution limits on firms, world price changes, and the ability to adjust labor employment.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 27

Keywords: lobbying, free-rider problem, size-distribution-of-firms, world-price, labor-market-flexibility

JEL Classification: F16, H0, L1

working papers series


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Date posted: March 10, 2012  

Suggested Citation

Mayer, Wolfgang and Mujumdar, Sudesh, Lobbying: Buying and Utilizing Access (2012). Economics Discussion Paper No. 2012-15. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2019378 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2019378

Contact Information

Wolfgang Mayer (Contact Author)
University of Cincinnati - McMicken College of Arts and Sciences - Department of Economics ( email )
1202 Crosley
P.O. Box 210371
Cincinnati, OH 45221-0371
United States
513-556-2600 (Phone)
513-556-2669 (Fax)
Sudesh Mujumdar
affiliation not provided to SSRN
Feedback to SSRN


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