Abstract

  


 



A Simple Auction Mechanism for Locating Noxious Facilities


Amitrajeet A. Batabyal


Rochester Institute of Technology

Hamid Beladi


University of Texas at San Antonio - College of Business - Department of Economics
March 12, 2012

Letters in Spatial and Resource Sciences, Vol. 5, pp. 1-6, 2012

Abstract:     
In this note, we analyze a simple auction mechanism for locating noxious facilities such as hazardous waste dumps, prisons, and trash disposal plants. Specifically, we first delineate the details of our auction mechanism. Next, we solve for the symmetric equilibrium of this auction. Finally, we argue that the auction under study is an efficient allocation mechanism.

Keywords: Auction, Efficiency, Noxious Facility, Symmetric Equilibrium

JEL Classification: Q53, D44

Accepted Paper Series


Date posted: March 14, 2012  

Suggested Citation

Batabyal, Amitrajeet A. and Beladi, Hamid, A Simple Auction Mechanism for Locating Noxious Facilities (March 12, 2012). Letters in Spatial and Resource Sciences, Vol. 5, pp. 1-6, 2012. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2020706

Contact Information

Amitrajeet A. Batabyal (Contact Author)
Rochester Institute of Technology ( email )
92 Lomb Memorial Drive
Rochester, NY 14623-5604
United States
585-475-2805 (Phone)
585-475-5777 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.rit.edu/~aabgsh/
Hamid Beladi
University of Texas at San Antonio - College of Business - Department of Economics ( email )
6900 North Loop 1604 West
P.O. Box 5636
San Antonio, TX 78249
United States
210-458-7038 (Phone)
210-458-7040 (Fax)
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


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