A Simple Auction Mechanism for Locating Noxious Facilities
Amitrajeet A. Batabyal
Rochester Institute of Technology
University of Texas at San Antonio - College of Business - Department of Economics
March 12, 2012
Letters in Spatial and Resource Sciences, Vol. 5, pp. 1-6, 2012
In this note, we analyze a simple auction mechanism for locating noxious facilities such as hazardous waste dumps, prisons, and trash disposal plants. Specifically, we first delineate the details of our auction mechanism. Next, we solve for the symmetric equilibrium of this auction. Finally, we argue that the auction under study is an efficient allocation mechanism.
Keywords: Auction, Efficiency, Noxious Facility, Symmetric Equilibrium
JEL Classification: Q53, D44Accepted Paper Series
Date posted: March 14, 2012
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