Abstract

 


 



Captive Finance and Firm’s Competitiveness


Andriy Bodnaruk


University of Notre Dame - Mendoza College of Business

Andrei Simonov


Michigan State University - Eli Broad Graduate School of Management; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy; SITE

William O'Brien


Purdue University - Department of Finance

March 13, 2012


Abstract:     
We study the relationship between the formation of a captive finance subsidiary and a firm’s competitiveness. Firms with captive finance subsidiaries have higher profitability, larger market share, and lower sales volatility, keep lower cash balances, and operate under lower leverage. These results become much stronger economically after accounting for endogeneity present in the allocation of captive finance subsidiaries across firms. Following the establishment of a captive, a firm’s profitability and its industry market share gradually increase; however, it takes about four years before these improvements become statistically and economically significant. Finally, we document that stock returns of companies with captive finance subsidiaries correlate more with finance industry returns than stock returns of companies without captives. Our results indicate that a significant part of profits of the largest US industrial corporations comes from what are in essence financial services.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 35

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Date posted: March 15, 2012  

Suggested Citation

Bodnaruk, Andriy, Simonov, Andrei and O'Brien, William, Captive Finance and Firm’s Competitiveness (March 13, 2012). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2021503 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2021503

Contact Information

Andriy Bodnaruk
University of Notre Dame - Mendoza College of Business ( email )
Notre Dame, IN 46556-5646
United States
Andrei Simonov (Contact Author)
Michigan State University - Eli Broad Graduate School of Management ( email )
315 Eppley Center
East Lansing, MI 48824-1122
United States
HOME PAGE: http://www.andreisimonov.com
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy ( email )
Moscow
Russia
SITE ( email )
P.O. Box 6501
S-113 83 Stockholm
Sweden
William O'Brien
Purdue University - Department of Finance ( email )
West Lafayette, IN 47907-1310
United States
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