Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2021564
 


 



Risk Preferences, Compensation Risk, and Employee Outcomes


Fidan Ana Kurtulus


University of Massachusetts at Amherst

Douglas L. Kruse


Rutgers University

Joseph Blasi


Rutgers School of Management and Labor Relations - New Brunswick

September 24, 2010

Annual LERA Research Volume: Employee Ownership and Shared Capitalism: New Directions and Debates for the 21st Century, Cornell University ILR Press, 2011

Abstract:     
We use the NBER Shared Capitalism Database comprised of more than 40,000 employee surveys from 14 firms to explore whether a close match between workers’ risk preferences and the riskiness of their compensation packages relates to improved employee outcomes including lower absenteeism, lower shirking, lower probability of voluntary turnover, greater worker motivation, and higher levels of job satisfaction and loyalty. To do this, we use survey questions reflecting workers’ risk aversion parameters, coupled with a series of measures of the riskiness of workers’ compensation packages including the proportion of pay comprised of various forms of shared capitalism such as profit and gain sharing, ownership of company stock, and bonus arrangements. The primary finding of our paper is that a match between the workers’ risk preferences and the extent of risk in their compensation increases workers’ motivation, job satisfaction, company attachment, and loyalty, but risk-averse workers are generally less responsive to a preference-compensation match than risk-loving workers.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 31

Keywords: Employee Ownership, Risk Aversion, Profit Sharing, Stock, Bonus

JEL Classification: J54, J33, M52

Accepted Paper Series


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Date posted: March 14, 2012  

Suggested Citation

Kurtulus, Fidan Ana and Kruse, Douglas L. and Blasi, Joseph, Risk Preferences, Compensation Risk, and Employee Outcomes (September 24, 2010). Annual LERA Research Volume: Employee Ownership and Shared Capitalism: New Directions and Debates for the 21st Century, Cornell University ILR Press, 2011. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2021564

Contact Information

Fidan Ana Kurtulus (Contact Author)
University of Massachusetts at Amherst ( email )
Amherst, MA 01003
United States
Douglas L. Kruse
Rutgers University ( email )
Piscataway, NJ 08854
United States
908-445-5991 (Phone)
908-445-2830 (Fax)
Joseph R. Blasi
Rutgers School of Management and Labor Relations - New Brunswick ( email )
Piscataway, NJ 08854
United States
732-445-5444 (Phone)
732-445-2830 (Fax)
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