Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2022191
 


 



Worlds in Collision: Merger Policy in Bankruptcy


Max Huffman


Indiana University Robert H. McKinney School of Law

March 14, 2012

Indiana University Robert H. McKinney School of Law Research Paper No. 2013-17

Abstract:     
Despite a deep literature on the failing firm defense and the frequency with which antitrust issues arise in corporate bankruptcy proceedings, the literature lacks an effort comprehensively to theorize an approach - and courts have not settled on a rule - that resolves the deep and enduring conflict between the estate-value-maximization goal of bankruptcy law and the consumer protection goal of merger review. This proposed article addresses that gap.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 10

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Date posted: March 16, 2012 ; Last revised: May 16, 2013

Suggested Citation

Huffman, Max, Worlds in Collision: Merger Policy in Bankruptcy (March 14, 2012). Indiana University Robert H. McKinney School of Law Research Paper No. 2013-17. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2022191 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2022191

Contact Information

Max Huffman (Contact Author)
Indiana University Robert H. McKinney School of Law ( email )
530 West New York Street
Indianapolis, IN 46202
United States

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