Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2022191
 


 



Worlds Colliding: Competition Policy and Bankruptcy Asset Sales


Max Huffman


Indiana University Robert H. McKinney School of Law

November 30, 2015

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 60, No. 5, p. 839, 2015
Indiana University Robert H. McKinney School of Law Research Paper No. 2013-17

Abstract:     
Modern business bankruptcies commonly involve mergers and acquisitions pursued as “fire sales.” The bankruptcy forum and the unique incentives bankruptcy creates allow those acquisitions to take place with reduced constituent involvement and regulatory oversight. Those fire sale transactions may present antitrust concerns where they lead to undue concentration in the relevant marketplace. This Article studies the poorly explored tension between bankruptcy law, which favors mergers and acquisitions as value maximizing propositions and creates opportunity for fire sales, and antitrust law, which disfavors combinations leading to undue concentrations of economic power. The tension is substantial and manifests both as a matter of substantive law and as a matter of procedures used to implement that law. This paper reveals conflicts between bankruptcy and antitrust and argues that the optimal resolution of those conflicts is to correct for the current subordination of antitrust goals to bankruptcy policies. The Article then offers suggestions for reform.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 64


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Date posted: March 16, 2012 ; Last revised: December 31, 2015

Suggested Citation

Huffman, Max, Worlds Colliding: Competition Policy and Bankruptcy Asset Sales (November 30, 2015). Villanova Law Review, Vol. 60, No. 5, p. 839, 2015; Indiana University Robert H. McKinney School of Law Research Paper No. 2013-17. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2022191 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2022191

Contact Information

Max Huffman (Contact Author)
Indiana University Robert H. McKinney School of Law ( email )
530 West New York Street
Indianapolis, IN 46202
United States

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