Abstract

 
 

Citations (4)



 


 



Should Derivatives Be Privileged in Bankruptcy?


Patrick Bolton


Columbia Business School - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Martin Oehmke


Columbia Business School - Finance and Economics

April 3, 2013


Abstract:     
Derivative contracts, swaps, and repos enjoy special status in bankruptcy: they are exempt from the automatic stay and, if collateralized, are effectively senior to virtually all other claims. We propose a simple corporate finance model to assess the effect of these exemptions on a firm's cost of borrowing and incentives to engage in efficient derivative transactions. We show that, while derivatives are value-enhancing risk management tools, effective seniority for derivatives can lead to inefficiencies because it may transfer credit risk to the firm's debtholders, even though this risk could be borne more efficiently in the derivative market. Effective seniority for derivatives is only efficient if it provides sufficient diversification benefits to derivative counterparties that provide hedging services.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 52

Keywords: Derivatives, Swaps, Automatic Stay, Chapter 11, QFCs

JEL Classification: G30, G33

working papers series


Download This Paper

Date posted: March 16, 2012 ; Last revised: April 4, 2013

Suggested Citation

Bolton, Patrick and Oehmke, Martin, Should Derivatives Be Privileged in Bankruptcy? (April 3, 2013). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2023227 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2023227

Contact Information

Patrick Bolton
Columbia Business School - Department of Economics ( email )
3022 Broadway
New York, NY 10027
United States
HOME PAGE: http://www0.gsb.columbia.edu/faculty/pbolton/

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium
HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org
Martin Oehmke (Contact Author)
Columbia Business School - Finance and Economics ( email )
3022 Broadway
New York, NY 10027
United States

Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 542
Downloads: 70
Download Rank: 147,268
Citations:  4
People who downloaded this paper also downloaded:
1. Derivatives Markets in Bankruptcy
By Mark Roe

© 2013 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright
This page was processed by apollo5 in 0.547 seconds