Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2023480
 
 

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The Role of Institutional Investors in Voting: Evidence from the Securities Lending Market


Reena Aggarwal


Georgetown University - Robert Emmett McDonough School of Business

Pedro A. C. Saffi


University of Cambridge - Judge Business School

Jason Sturgess


DePaul University

November 2014

Journal of Finance, Forthcoming

Abstract:     
This paper investigates the voting preferences of institutional investors using the unique setting of the securities lending market. Institutional investors restrict lendable supply and/or call back loaned shares prior to the proxy record date to exercise voting rights. Recall is higher for investors with greater incentives to monitor and exert governance, for firms with poor performance and weak governance, and for proposals where the returns to governance are likely to be higher such as those relating to corporate control. Loan demand and the borrowing fee also increase around the record date. In the subsequent vote outcome we find higher share recall to be associated with less support for management and more support for shareholder proposals. Our results indicate that institutions value their vote and use the proxy process as an important channel for affecting corporate governance.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 53

Keywords: Proxy Voting, Securities Lending, Institutional Investors

JEL Classification: G32, G34, G38


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Date posted: March 17, 2012 ; Last revised: May 22, 2015

Suggested Citation

Aggarwal, Reena and Saffi, Pedro A. C. and Sturgess, Jason, The Role of Institutional Investors in Voting: Evidence from the Securities Lending Market (November 2014). Journal of Finance, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2023480 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2023480

Contact Information

Reena Aggarwal (Contact Author)
Georgetown University - Robert Emmett McDonough School of Business ( email )
3700 O Street, NW
Washington, DC 20057
United States
202-687-3784 (Phone)
202-687-0798 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://explore.georgetown.edu/people/aggarwal/

Pedro A. C. Saffi
University of Cambridge - Judge Business School ( email )
Trumpington Street
Cambridge, CB2 1AG
United Kingdom
HOME PAGE: http://www.pedrosaffi.com
Jason Sturgess
DePaul University ( email )
1 East Jackson Blvd.
Chicago, IL 60604
United States
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