The Role of Institutional Investors in Voting: Evidence from the Securities Lending Market
Georgetown University - Robert Emmett McDonough School of Business
Pedro A. C. Saffi
University of Cambridge - Judge Business School
Journal of Finance, Forthcoming
This paper investigates the voting preferences of institutional investors using the unique setting of the securities lending market. Institutional investors restrict lendable supply and/or call back loaned shares prior to the proxy record date to exercise voting rights. Recall is higher for investors with greater incentives to monitor and exert governance, for firms with poor performance and weak governance, and for proposals where the returns to governance are likely to be higher such as those relating to corporate control. Loan demand and the borrowing fee also increase around the record date. In the subsequent vote outcome we find higher share recall to be associated with less support for management and more support for shareholder proposals. Our results indicate that institutions value their vote and use the proxy process as an important channel for affecting corporate governance.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 53
Keywords: Proxy Voting, Securities Lending, Institutional Investors
JEL Classification: G32, G34, G38
Date posted: March 17, 2012 ; Last revised: May 22, 2015
© 2016 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
This page was processed by apollobot1 in 0.234 seconds