Does Regulation Affect Economic Outcomes? The Case of Dentistry
Morris M. Kleiner
University of Minnesota - Twin Cities - Hubert H. Humphrey Institute of Public Affairs; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
Robert T. Kudrle
University of Minnesota, Twin Cities
December 30, 1999
This study examines the role of variations in occupational licensing policies in improving the quality of services provided to consumers and the effect of restrictive regulations on the prices of certain services and on the earnings of practitioners. Theory suggests that more restrictive licensing may raise prices, but that it may also raise demand by reducing uncertainty about the quality of the services. This paper uses unique data on the dental health of incoming Air Force personnel to analyze empirically the effects of varying licensing stringency among the states. We find that tougher licensing does not improve outcomes, but it does raise prices and earnings of practitioners. Our results cast doubt on the principal public interest argument in favor of more stringent state licensing practices.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 48
JEL Classification: J3, J4, K2, L5
Date posted: June 26, 2000
© 2016 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
This page was processed by apollobot1 in 0.235 seconds