Abstract

 


 



Fixing the Patent Office


Mark A. Lemley


Stanford Law School

March 15, 2012

Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No. 422

Abstract:     
How can we fix the PTO, allowing examiners to effectively distinguish between patentable and unpatentable inventions, without slowing the process to a crawl or wasting a bunch of money? This essay reviews the recent literature and considers a number of proposals and their problems. It concludes that we can make the PTO better, but are unlikely to solve the problem of bad patents altogether. Rather than focusing on adding money, the focus must increasingly turn to understanding and changing applicant and examiner incentives.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 16

JEL Classification: K, K23, O31, O34, O4

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Date posted: March 16, 2012 ; Last revised: May 16, 2012

Suggested Citation

Lemley, Mark A., Fixing the Patent Office (March 15, 2012). Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No. 422. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2023958 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2023958

Contact Information

Mark A. Lemley (Contact Author)
Stanford Law School ( email )
559 Nathan Abbott Way
Stanford, CA 94305-8610
United States
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