Is Disclosure an Effective Cleansing Mechanism? The Dynamics of Compensation Peer Benchmarking
Michael W. Faulkender
University of Maryland - Robert H. Smith School of Business
Indiana University - Kelley School of Business - Department of Finance
March 15, 2012
AFA 2013 San Diego Meetings Paper
Firms routinely justify CEO compensation by benchmarking against companies with highly paid CEOs. We examine whether the 2006 regulatory requirement of disclosing compensation peers mitigated firms’ opportunistic peer selection activities. We find that strategic peer benchmarking did not disappear after enhanced disclosure. In fact, it intensified at firms with low institutional ownership, low director ownership, low CEO ownership, busy boards, large boards, and non-intensive monitoring boards, and at firms with shareholders complaining about compensation practices. The effect is also stronger at firms with new CEOs. These findings call into question whether disclosure regulation can remedy potential problems in compensation practices.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 34
Keywords: disclosure regulation, corporate governance, executive compensation, peer groups, benchmarking
JEL Classification: G34, J31, J33
Date posted: March 18, 2012 ; Last revised: May 14, 2014
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