Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2024513
 
 

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Financing Through Asset Sales


Alex Edmans


London Business School - Institute of Finance and Accounting; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

William Mann


UCLA Anderson School

June 20, 2016

ECGI - Finance Working Paper No. 344/2013

Abstract:     
Most research on firm financing studies debt versus equity issuance. We model an alternative source, non-core asset sales, and contrast it with equity. First, unlike asset purchasers, equity investors own a claim to the firm's balance sheet (the "balance sheet effect"). This includes the cash raised, mitigating information asymmetry. Contrary to the intuition of Myers and Majluf (1984), even if non-core assets exhibit less information asymmetry, the firm issues equity if the financing need is high. Second, firms can disguise the sale of low-quality assets -- but not equity -- as motivated by dissynergies (the "camouflage effect"). Third, selling equity implies a "lemons" discount for not only the equity issued but also the rest of the firm, since both are perfectly correlated (the "correlation effect"). A discount on assets need not reduce the stock price, since non-core assets are not a carbon copy of the firm.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 54

Keywords: Asset sales, financing, pecking order, synergies

JEL Classification: G32, G34


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Date posted: March 19, 2012 ; Last revised: June 22, 2016

Suggested Citation

Edmans, Alex and Mann, William, Financing Through Asset Sales (June 20, 2016). ECGI - Finance Working Paper No. 344/2013. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2024513 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2024513

Contact Information

Alex Edmans (Contact Author)
London Business School - Institute of Finance and Accounting ( email )
Sussex Place
Regent's Park
London NW1 4SA
United Kingdom
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )
c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
William Mann
UCLA Anderson School ( email )
United States

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