Competition Policy, Patent Pools and Copyright Collectives
University of Toronto - Department of Economics
December 31, 2011
Review of Economic Research on Copyright Issues, Vol. 8, No. 2, pp. 3-34, 2011
This paper analyzes and compares two types of cooperative agreements that combine Intellectual Property (IP): patent pools and copyright collectives. I evaluate antitrust policy in three environments in which owners of the intellectual property (IP): (1) are vertically integrated into the downstream (product) market; (2) face competition in the upstream (input) market and (3) own downstream products that do not require a license on the pooled IP but compete with products that do. Although patent pools and copyright collectives differ in purpose, membership size and market conditions, their efficiency implications are qualitatively similar in each of the three situations. Therefore, a uniform rather than IP-specific competition policy is appropriate for pools and collectives, thus lending economic support for the approach followed by antitrust authorities toward IP-related cooperative agreements.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 32Accepted Paper Series
Date posted: March 17, 2012
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