Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2024764
 
 

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Corporate Governance and Firm Performance


Anup Agrawal


University of Alabama - Culverhouse College of Commerce & Business Administration

Charles R. Knoeber


North Carolina State University - Poole College of Management

March 15, 2012

OXFORD HANDBOOK IN MANAGERIAL ECONOMICS, Christopher R. Thomas, William F. Shughart II, eds., Oxford University Press, 2012

Abstract:     
This paper reviews the literature on corporate governance and firm performance in economies with relatively dispersed stock ownership and an active market for corporate control, such as the US and the UK. We provide a conceptual overview, suggest important issues, and offer a pathway to this large literature. Section 1 outlines a framework of the basic agency problem between managers and shareholders and the corporate governance mechanisms that have evolved to address this problem. Section 2 deals with the relation between firm performance and inside ownership. Section 3 pertains to the relation between firm performance and monitoring by large shareholders, monitoring by boards, and shareholder rights regarding takeover of the firm. Section 4 considers the relation between governance regulation and firm performance. Section 5 deals with the relation between governance and firm performance in family firms, and section 6 provides a summary and identifies some remaining puzzles and unresolved issues for future research.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 26

Keywords: Corporate Governance, Firm Performance

JEL Classification: G34, K22

Accepted Paper Series


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Date posted: March 17, 2012  

Suggested Citation

Agrawal, Anup and Knoeber, Charles R., Corporate Governance and Firm Performance (March 15, 2012). OXFORD HANDBOOK IN MANAGERIAL ECONOMICS, Christopher R. Thomas, William F. Shughart II, eds., Oxford University Press, 2012. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2024764

Contact Information

Anup Agrawal (Contact Author)
University of Alabama - Culverhouse College of Commerce & Business Administration ( email )
Culverhouse College of Business
EFLS, Box 870224
Tuscaloosa, AL 35487-0223
United States
205-348-8970 (Phone)
205-348-0590 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://old.cba.ua.edu/personnel/AnupAgrawal.html
Charles R. Knoeber
North Carolina State University - Poole College of Management ( email )
Raleigh, NC 27695-8614
United States
919-513-2874 (Phone)
919-515-7873 (Fax)
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