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Horses for Courses: Fund Managers and Organizational Structures


Yufeng Han


University of Colorado at Denver - Business School

Thomas H. Noe


University of Oxford - Said Business School; University of Oxford - Balliol College; European Corporate Governance Institute

Michael J. Rebello


University of Texas at Dallas - Naveen Jindal School of Management

March 9, 2012


Abstract:     
We model and test the relations between the team management of mutual funds, fund manager ability, fund performance, and holdings. Our model predicts that team-managed funds will perform better, allocate their funds more conservatively, and trade less aggressively than single-manager funds. However, high ability managers will rationally self-select into single-manager funds. Consistent with the model's prediction we find that team-managed funds outperform single-manager funds with the same characteristics by 23 to 38 basis point a year. This superior performance is only discernible once we control for the endogenous self-selection of managers. Also consistent with the model's predictions, we find that team-managed funds deviate less from their benchmark allocations and trade less aggressively in response to changes in sell-side analyst recommendations.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 58

Keywords: Team Management, Fund Performance, Fund Holdings, Self Selection

JEL Classification: G29

working papers series


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Date posted: March 20, 2012  

Suggested Citation

Han, Yufeng, Noe, Thomas H. and Rebello, Michael J., Horses for Courses: Fund Managers and Organizational Structures (March 9, 2012). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2024769 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2024769

Contact Information

Yufeng Han (Contact Author)
University of Colorado at Denver - Business School ( email )
1475 Lawrence St.
Denver, CO 80204
United States
303-3158458 (Phone)
Thomas H. Noe
University of Oxford - Said Business School ( email )
Park End Street
Oxford, OX1 3BJ
United Kingdom
University of Oxford - Balliol College ( email )
Broad St
Oxford, OX1 3BJ
United Kingdom
European Corporate Governance Institute ( email )
c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium
Michael J. Rebello
University of Texas at Dallas - Naveen Jindal School of Management ( email )
P.O. Box 830688
Richardson, TX 75083-0688
United States
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


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