Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2025173
 
 

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Stability and Endogenous Formation of Inventory Transshipment Networks


Xin Fang


Carnegie Mellon University - David A. Tepper School of Business

Soo-Haeng Cho


Carnegie Mellon University - Tepper School of Business

September 15, 2014

Forthcoming in Operations Research

Abstract:     
This paper studies a cooperative game of inventory transshipment among multiple firms. In this game, firms first make their inventory decisions independently under uncertain demands, and then decide collectively how to transship excess inventories to satisfy unmet demands. Instead of coalitions that are used in all previous studies, we use networks of firms as the primitive, which offer a richer representation of relationships among firms by taking coalitions as special cases. When the profit generated from transshipment is allocated according to the marginal contribution of each firm to its network, we find that various network structures such as complete, circle, and hub-spoke systems are not always stable in the sense that some firms may find it more profitable to form subnetworks; instead, the line system, in which all firms with residual supplies are placed on one side and all firms with residual demands are placed on the other side, is the only network structure that is stable for any residual amounts. However, there exists an allocation mechanism under which a given network system is always stable for any residual amounts. When firms establish networks endogenously, we characterize pairwise Nash stable networks, and show that these networks underperform the corresponding networks in centralized systems.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 39

Keywords: Games/group decisions, Cooperative, Networks, Inventory

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Date posted: March 18, 2012 ; Last revised: September 23, 2014

Suggested Citation

Fang, Xin and Cho, Soo-Haeng, Stability and Endogenous Formation of Inventory Transshipment Networks (September 15, 2014). Forthcoming in Operations Research. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2025173 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2025173

Contact Information

Xin Fang
Carnegie Mellon University - David A. Tepper School of Business ( email )
5000 Forbes Avenue
Pittsburgh, PA 15213-3890
United States
Soo-Haeng Cho (Contact Author)
Carnegie Mellon University - Tepper School of Business ( email )
Pittsburgh, PA 15213-3890
United States
HOME PAGE: http://public.tepper.cmu.edu/facultydirectory/FacultyDirectoryProfile.aspx?id=290
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