Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2025193
 


 



Tax Deregulation


Steven Dean


Brooklyn Law School

March 16, 2012

New York University Law Review, Vol. 86, p. 387, 2011
Brooklyn Law School, Legal Studies Paper No. 270

Abstract:     
Deregulation has played both the hero and the villain in recent years. This article evaluates the impact of deregulation on what may be the single most economically important regulatory regime: the income tax. In order to accomplish this goal, it applies the concepts of fiscal arbitrage and compliance spirals to three deregulatory tax reforms. Compliance spirals describe an enforcement dynamic in which the regulator encourages compliance through a system of rewards for cooperation andpunishment for noncooperation. Fiscal arbitrage describes policy measures that exploit cognitive biases and other anomalies to deliver political benefits by using minimal political capital. The combination of these two concepts creates a tool for tax authorities to evaluate deregulatory tax provisions for likely costs and benefits. On balance, this article finds that tax deregulation is likely to be harmful.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 51

Keywords: tax policy, tax simplification, corporate tax, deregulation, autonomy, libertarian

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Date posted: March 21, 2012  

Suggested Citation

Dean, Steven, Tax Deregulation (March 16, 2012). New York University Law Review, Vol. 86, p. 387, 2011; Brooklyn Law School, Legal Studies Paper No. 270. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2025193

Contact Information

Steven Dean (Contact Author)
Brooklyn Law School ( email )
250 Joralemon Street
Brooklyn, NY 11201
United States

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