Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2026223
 


 



Inner Core, Asymmetric Nash Bargaining Solutions and Competitive Payoffs


Sonja Brangewitz


Bielefeld University - Center for Mathematical Economics

Jan Philip Gamp


Bielefeld University - Center for Mathematical Economics

August 29, 2011

Institute of Mathematical Economics Working Paper No. 453

Abstract:     
We investigate the relationship between the inner core and asymmetric Nash bargaining solutions for n-person bargaining games with complete information. We show that the set of asymmetric Nash bargaining solutions for different strictly positive vectors of weights coincides with the inner core if all points in the underlying bargaining set are strictly positive. Furthermore, we prove that every bargaining game is a market game. By using the results of Qin (1993) we conclude that for every possible vector of weights of the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution there exists an economy that has this asymmetric Nash bargaining solution as its unique competitive payoff vector. We relate the literature of Trockel (1996, 2005) with the ideas of Qin (1993). Our result can be seen as a market foundation for every asymmetric Nash bargaining solution in analogy to the results on non-cooperative foundations of cooperative games.

Keywords: Inner Core, Asymmetric Nash Bargaining Solution, Competitive Payoffs, Market Games

JEL Classification: C71, C78, D51

working papers series


Not Available For Download

Date posted: March 20, 2012  

Suggested Citation

Brangewitz, Sonja and Gamp, Jan Philip, Inner Core, Asymmetric Nash Bargaining Solutions and Competitive Payoffs (August 29, 2011). Institute of Mathematical Economics Working Paper No. 453. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2026223

Contact Information

Sonja Brangewitz (Contact Author)
Bielefeld University - Center for Mathematical Economics ( email )
Postfach 10 01 31
Bielefeld, D-33501
Germany
Jan Philip Gamp
Bielefeld University - Center for Mathematical Economics ( email )
Postfach 10 01 31
Bielefeld, D-33501
Germany
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 207

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo4 in 2.641 seconds