Mutual Fund Agency Conflicts
John A. Haslem
University of Maryland - Robert H. Smith School of Business
July 16, 2012
The purpose of this study is to discuss various types of agency conflicts that negatively impact mutual fund shareholder interests. In so doing, shareholders should get an improved understanding of conflicts that place them at such a disadvantage in fund investing.
Many fund advisers are motivated to use each available agency conflict to their advantage. But, even if not, conflicts in the Investment Company Act of 1940, adverse court decisions, and the 2003 fund scandal have done quite enough harm to shareholders. Also, several major findings of fund agency conflicts with shareholders are discussed.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 36
Keywords: mutual funds, agency conflicts, ICA, shareholder interests, in-depth findings
JEL Classification: G2, G23, G28working papers series
Date posted: March 21, 2012 ; Last revised: October 14, 2012
© 2015 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
This page was processed by apollo1 in 0.375 seconds