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A Theory of State Censorship


Mehdi Shadmehr


University of Miami - School of Business Administration - Department of Economics

Dan Bernhardt


University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign - Department of Economics
March 21, 2012


Abstract:     
We characterize a ruler's decision of whether to censor media reports that convey public information to citizens who decide whether to revolt. We find: (1) a ruler gains (his ex ante expected payoff increases) by committing to censoring slightly less than he does in equilibrium: his equilibrium calculations ignore that censoring less causes citizens to update more positively following no news; (2) a ruler gains from higher censorship costs if and only if censorship costs exceed a critical threshold; (3) a bad ruler prefers a very active media to a very passive one, while a good ruler prefers the opposite.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 29

Keywords: Censorship, Media Freedom, Public Signal, Information Manipulation, Protest, Revolution, Regime Change

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Date posted: July 19, 2012 ; Last revised: July 20, 2012

Suggested Citation

Shadmehr, Mehdi and Bernhardt, Dan, A Theory of State Censorship (March 21, 2012). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2027052 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2027052

Contact Information

Mehdi Shadmehr (Contact Author)
University of Miami - School of Business Administration - Department of Economics ( email )
P.O. Box 248126
Coral Gables, FL 33124-6550
United States
Dan Bernhardt
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign - Department of Economics ( email )
1206 South Sixth Street
Champaign, IL 61820
United States
217-244-5708 (Phone)
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