Preserving Competition: Economic Analysis, Legal Standards and Microsoft
Ronald A. Cass
Center for the Rule of Law; Cass & Associates, PC; Boston University School of Law; Center for the Study of the Administrative State at George Mason School of Law
Keith N. Hylton
Boston University - School of Law
George Mason Law Review, Vol. 8, No. 1, 1999
In a recent symposium issue of the George Mason Law Review, Steven Salop and R. Craig Romaine use the Microsoft litigation as a focus for discussion of antitrust law. Salop and Romaine argue that each of the allegations against Microsoft could constitute evidence of a design by Microsoft to reduce competition and to preserve or extend monopoly power. They argue as well that the right legal standard to apply in monopolization cases is a "competitive effects" test that balances the benefits and harms of the monopolist's conduct. This article exposes problems with their approach, explains why it departs from current antitrust standards, and urges an approach consistent with current standards.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 46
Date posted: January 5, 2000
© 2016 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
This page was processed by apollobot1 in 0.203 seconds