SSRN Home Search and Download Papers Browse Abstract and Paper Submission Subscribe to Networks View Briefcase Top Papers Top Authors Top Institutions

 

Abstract

 
 

Citations (123)

Beta

 
 

Footnotes (70)

Beta

 


 


Download | Share | Email | Add to Briefcase | Buy Hard Copy

A Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate Ownership and Governance

Lucian A. Bebchuk
Harvard University - Harvard Law School; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Mark J. Roe
Harvard Law School; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)



Stanford Law Review, Vol. 52, pp. 127-170, 1999
Columbia Law School, Center for Studies in Law & Economics Paper No. 131, November 1999

Abstract:     
Corporate structures differ among the advanced economies of the world. We contribute to an understanding of these differences by developing a theory of the path dependence of corporate structure. The corporate structures that an economy has at any point in time depend in part on those that it had at earlier times. Two sources of path dependence--structure driven and rule driven--are identified and analyzed. First, the corporate structures of an economy depend on the structures with which the economy started. Initial ownership structures have such an effect because they affect the identity of the structure that would be efficient for any given company and because they can give some parties both incentives and power to impede changes in them. Second, corporate rules, which affect ownership structures, will themselves depend on the corporate structures with which the economy started. Initial ownership structures can affect both the identity of the rules that would be efficient and the interest group politics that can determine which rules would actually be chosen. Our theory of path dependence sheds light on why the advanced economies, despite pressures to converge, vary in their ownership structures. It also provides a basis for why some important differences might persist.

JEL Classifications: G3, K22

Accepted Paper Series

Date posted: January 03, 2000 ; Last revised: April 26, 2009

Suggested Citation

Bebchuk, Lucian A. and Roe, Mark J., A Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate Ownership and Governance (October 1, 1999). Stanford Law Review, Vol. 52, pp. 127-170, 1999; Columbia Law School, Center for Studies in Law & Economics Paper No. 131, November 1999. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=202748 or doi:10.2139/ssrn.202748


Export to: Export Citation What's this?

Contact Information

Mark J. Roe (Contact Author)
Harvard Law School ( email )
Griswold 502
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
617-495-8099 (Phone)
617-495-4299 (Fax)
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels Belgium
HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org
Lucian A. Bebchuk
Harvard University - Harvard Law School ( email )
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
617-495-3138 (Phone)
617-496-3119 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/bebchuk/
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels Belgium
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 9,887
Downloads: 3,774
Download Rank: 438
Citations: 123
Footnotes: 70

© 2009 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright
This page was served by apollo6 in 0.219 seconds.