Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2028196
 


 



The Strategic Use of Public and Private Litigation in Antitrust as Business Strategy


D. Daniel Sokol


University of Florida - Levin College of Law; George Washington University Law School Competition Law Center

March 23, 2012

Southern California Law Review, Vol. 85, 2012
Minnesota Legal Studies Research Paper No. 13-02

Abstract:     
This Article claims that there may be a subset of cases in which private rights of action may work with public rights as an effective strategy for a firm to raise costs against rival dominant firms. A competitor firm may bring its own case (which is costly) and/or have government bring a case on its behalf (which is less costly). Alternatively, if the competitor firm has sufficient financial resources, it can pursue an approach that employs both strategies simultaneously. This situation of public and private misuse of antitrust may not happen often. As the Article will explore, it is not only a theoretical argument. This Article will provide examples of where this may have occurred both in antitrust's formative years and in its present.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 44

Keywords: antitrust, enforcement, private rights, federal antitrust, state antitrust, public choice, Standard Oil, Intel, Microsoft, Google,

JEL Classification: K21, L40, L12, D72

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Date posted: March 25, 2012 ; Last revised: January 19, 2014

Suggested Citation

Sokol, D. Daniel, The Strategic Use of Public and Private Litigation in Antitrust as Business Strategy (March 23, 2012). Southern California Law Review, Vol. 85, 2012; Minnesota Legal Studies Research Paper No. 13-02. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2028196

Contact Information

D. Daniel Sokol (Contact Author)
University of Florida - Levin College of Law ( email )
Spessard L. Holland Law Center
P.O. Box 117625
Gainesville, FL 32611-7625
United States
(352) 273-0968 (Phone)
(352) 392-3005 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.law.ufl.edu/faculty/sokol/
George Washington University Law School Competition Law Center ( email )
200 H Street, NW
Washington, DC 20052
United States
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