Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2029312
 
 

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Optimal Disclosure Policy and Undue Diligence


David Andolfatto


Simon Fraser University (SFU) - Department of Economics

Aleksander Berentsen


University of Basel - Economics Department; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Christopher J. Waller


University of Notre Dame - Department of Economics

November 3, 2011

Federal Reserve Board of Saint Louis Working Paper No. 2012-001A

Abstract:     
While both public and private financial agencies supply asset markets with large amounts of information, they do not generally disclose all asset-related information to the general public. This observation leads us to ask what principles might govern the optimal disclosure policy for an asset manager or financial regulator. To investigate this question, we study the properties of a dynamic economy endowed with a risky asset, and with individuals that lack commitment. Information relating to future asset returns is available to society at zero cost. Legislation dictates whether this information is to be made public or not. Given the properties of our environment, nondisclosure is generally desirable. This result is overturned, however, when individuals are able to access hidden information — what we call undue diligence — at sufficiently low cost. Information disclosure is desirable, in other words, only to the extent that individuals can easily discover it for themselves.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 28

Keywords: Monetary Policy, Central Banking, Supply of Money and Credit

JEL Classification: E5

working papers series


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Date posted: March 31, 2012  

Suggested Citation

Andolfatto, David and Berentsen, Aleksander and Waller, Christopher J., Optimal Disclosure Policy and Undue Diligence (November 3, 2011). Federal Reserve Board of Saint Louis Working Paper No. 2012-001A. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2029312 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2029312

Contact Information

David Andolfatto (Contact Author)
Simon Fraser University (SFU) - Department of Economics ( email )
8888 University Drive
Burnaby, British Columbia V5A 1S6
Canada
604 291-5825 (Phone)
604 291-5944 (Fax)
Aleksander Berentsen
University of Basel - Economics Department ( email )
Petersgraben 51
Basel, CH-4003
Switzerland
CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)
Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany
Christopher J. Waller
University of Notre Dame - Department of Economics ( email )
434 Flanner Hall
Notre Dame, IN 46556
United States
574-631-4963 (Phone)
574-631-9238 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.nd.edu/~cwaller/
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