Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2029356
 
 

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How Protective is D&O Insurance in Securities Class Actions?


Michael Klausner


Stanford Law School

Jason Hegland


Stanford Law School

February 28, 2010

PLUS Journal, Vol. 23, No. 2, February 2010
Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No. 425

Abstract:     
This article provides basic descriptive statistics on actual payments by D&O insurers for amounts paid in settling securities class actions. Insurers cover 100% of settlements in over 50% of cases and something less than 100% in another 35% of cases. Officers and (rarely) directors pay in 6% of cases.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 4

Keywords: Director and Officer Liability Insurance, Director and Officer Liability, Securities, Securities Class Actions, Shareholder Litigation, Settlement

JEL Classification: G30, G38, G39, K22

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Date posted: March 29, 2012 ; Last revised: April 26, 2012

Suggested Citation

Klausner, Michael and Hegland, Jason, How Protective is D&O Insurance in Securities Class Actions? (February 28, 2010). PLUS Journal, Vol. 23, No. 2, February 2010; Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No. 425. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2029356

Contact Information

Michael D. Klausner (Contact Author)
Stanford Law School ( email )
559 Nathan Abbott Way
Stanford, CA 94305-8610
United States
650-723-6433 (Phone)
650-725-0253 (Fax)
Jason Hegland
Stanford Law School ( email )
559 Nathan Abbott Way
Stanford, CA 94305-8610
United States
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