Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2029360
 
 

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Dynamically Sabotage-Proof Tournaments


Junichiro Ishida


Osaka University - Institute of Social and Economic Research

March 26, 2012

ISER Discussion Paper No. 838

Abstract:     
This paper explores the consequences of sabotage for the design of incentive contracts. The possibility of sabotage gives rise to a dynamic concern, similar to the Ratchet effect, which distorts the agents' incentives. We first show that the mere possibility of sabotage may make it impossible to implement the first-best effort, and then offer two distinct incentive schemes, fast track and late selection, to circumvent this problem. The present model offers a mechanism through which these two schemes arise in a unified framework.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 34

Keywords: Sabotage, Tournament, Fast track, Late selection

JEL Classification: J41;M12.

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Date posted: March 26, 2012  

Suggested Citation

Ishida, Junichiro, Dynamically Sabotage-Proof Tournaments (March 26, 2012). ISER Discussion Paper No. 838. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2029360 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2029360

Contact Information

Junichiro Ishida (Contact Author)
Osaka University - Institute of Social and Economic Research ( email )
6-1 Mihogaoka
Ibaraki, Osaka 567-0047
Japan
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