Abstract

 


 



Business Group Affiliation, Ownership Structure, and the Cost of Debt


Hae-Young Byun


affiliation not provided to SSRN

Sunhwa Choi


Lancaster University

Lee-Seok Hwang


Seoul National University - College of Business Administration

Robert G. Kim


University at Buffalo (SUNY)

March 30, 2012


Abstract:     
This paper examines the relation between business group affiliation and the cost of debt capital. The co-insurance effect associated with business groups can reduce the cost of debt, while the expropriation by controlling shareholders can raise the cost of debt. We find that firms affiliated with major Korean business groups (i.e., chaebols) enjoy a substantially lower cost of public debt than do independent firms, consistent with the co-insurance argument. We also find that the effect of group affiliation on the cost of debt is stronger for firms with poor credit quality and with opaque financial statements, and when the economy is in downturns. These findings are consistent with the notion that the value of co-insurance increases with the uncertainty about the future payoffs of debtholders. Our study highlights that the role of business groups is distinct from and incremental to the role of ownership structure in the debt market.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 48

Keywords: Business Groups, Ownership, Cost of Debt Capital, Public Bonds

JEL Classification: G15, G30

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Date posted: March 30, 2012  

Suggested Citation

Byun, Hae-Young, Choi, Sunhwa, Hwang, Lee-Seok and Kim, Robert G., Business Group Affiliation, Ownership Structure, and the Cost of Debt (March 30, 2012). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2031438 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2031438

Contact Information

Hae-Young Byun
affiliation not provided to SSRN ( email )
Sunhwa Choi
Lancaster University ( email )
Lancaster LA1 4YX
United Kingdom
Lee-Seok Hwang (Contact Author)
Seoul National University - College of Business Administration ( email )
Seoul, 151-742
Korea
Robert G. Kim
University at Buffalo (SUNY) ( email )
12 Capen Hall
Buffalo, NY 14260
United States
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


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