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http://ssrn.com/abstract=2031821
 
 

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Large Shareholders and Accounting Research


Ole-Kristian Hope


University of Toronto - Rotman School of Management

October 9, 2012


Abstract:     
Large shareholders are a potentially very important element of firms’ corporate governance system. Whereas analytical research is typically vague on who these large shareholders are, in practice there are important variations in the types of large owners (and the different types of large owners could play very different governance roles). After briefly reviewing the standard agency cost arguments, in this article I emphasize the heterogeneity of concentrated ownership and in particular focus on the roles of families, institutions, governments, and employee ownership. I also discuss the role of large shareholders in private (i.e., unlisted) firms, where ownership tends to be more concentrated than in publicly traded firms. Finally, I briefly discuss variations in ownership structures across selected countries.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 38

Keywords: Large shareholders, agency costs, controlling owners, minority owners, private firms, international

JEL Classification: G30, G32, G38, M20, M41

working papers series


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Date posted: April 1, 2012 ; Last revised: October 9, 2012

Suggested Citation

Hope, Ole-Kristian, Large Shareholders and Accounting Research (October 9, 2012). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2031821 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2031821

Contact Information

Ole-Kristian Hope (Contact Author)
University of Toronto - Rotman School of Management ( email )
105 St. George Street
Toronto, Ontario M5S 3E6
Canada
416-946-3610 (Phone)
416-971-3048 (Fax)
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