Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2031926
 
 

References (104)



 
 

Footnotes (13)



 


 



Remedies for Sick Insurance


Daniel L. McFadden


University of California, Berkeley - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Carlos Noton


affiliation not provided to SSRN

Pau Olivella


Autonomous University of Barcelona - Department of Business Administration; International Health Economics Association (iHEA)

March 2012

NBER Working Paper No. w17938

Abstract:     
This expository paper describes the factors that contribute to failure of health insurance markets, and the regulatory mechanisms that have been and can be used to combat these failures. Standardized contracts and creditable coverage mandates are discussed, along with premium support, enrollment mandates, guaranteed issue, and risk adjustment, as remedies for selection-related market damage. An overall conclusion of the paper is that the design and management of creditable coverage mandates are likely to be key determinants of the performance of the health insurance exchanges that are a core provision of the PPACA of 2010. Enrollment mandates, premium subsidies, and risk adjustment can improve the stability and relative efficiency of the exchanges, but with carefully designed creditable coverage mandates are not necessarily critical for their operation.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 47

working papers series


Date posted: March 31, 2012  

Suggested Citation

McFadden, Daniel L. and Noton, Carlos and Olivella, Pau, Remedies for Sick Insurance (March 2012). NBER Working Paper No. w17938. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2031926

Contact Information

Daniel L. McFadden (Contact Author)
University of California, Berkeley - Department of Economics ( email )
549 Evans Hall #3880
Berkeley, CA 94720-3880
United States
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Carlos Noton
affiliation not provided to SSRN
Pau Olivella
Autonomous University of Barcelona - Department of Business Administration ( email )
Campus Bellaterra Edifici B.
Bellaterra (Barcelona), 08193
Spain
3493-581 2369 (Phone)
3493-581 24 61 (Fax)
International Health Economics Association (iHEA) ( email )
435 East Durham Street
Philadelphia, PA 19119
United States
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Abstract Views: 207
Downloads: 5
References:  104
Footnotes:  13

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