Abstract

 


 



Can Competition Reduce Quality?


Kurt Richard Brekke


Norwegian School of Economics (NHH) - Department of Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research)

Luigi Siciliani


University of York (UK)

Odd Rune Straume


University of Minho - Economic Policies Research Unit (NIPE); CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research)

March 28, 2012

NHH Dept. of Economics Discussion Paper No. 9/2012

Abstract:     
We study the effect of competition on quality in markets such as health care, long-term care and education, when providers choose both prices and quality in a setting of spatial competition. We offer a novel mechanism whereby competition leads to lower quality. This mechanism relies on two key assumptions, namely that the providers are motivated and risk-averse. Our proposed mechanism can help explain several empirical findings of a negative effect of competition on quality.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 14

Keywords: Quality and price competition, Motivated providers, Risk-averse providers

JEL Classification: D21, D43, L13, L30

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Date posted: April 2, 2012  

Suggested Citation

Brekke, Kurt Richard, Siciliani, Luigi and Straume, Odd Rune, Can Competition Reduce Quality? (March 28, 2012). NHH Dept. of Economics Discussion Paper No. 9/2012. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2033123 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2033123

Contact Information

Kurt Richard Brekke (Contact Author)
Norwegian School of Economics (NHH) - Department of Economics ( email )
Helleveien 30
N-5035 Bergen
Norway

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research)
Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany
Luigi Siciliani
University of York (UK) ( email )
Heslington, York YO10 5DD
United Kingdom
Odd Rune Straume
University of Minho - Economic Policies Research Unit (NIPE) ( email )
Campus de Gualtar
Braga, 4710-057
Portugal
CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research)
Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany
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