More Thoughts on the Compact Clause and the National Popular Vote: A Response to Professor Hendricks
Derek T. Muller
Pepperdine University - School of Law
Election Law Journal, Vol. 7, p. 227, 2008
This article briefly responds to three of the more salient issues noted by Professor Hendricks in her article "Popular Election of the President: Using or Abusing the Electoral College?, 7 ELECTION L.J. 218 (2008). First, I establish that the Supreme Court actually would enforce the requirement of congressional consent for the Compact under its current jurisprudence according to the "Political Consent" Compact Clause. Second, I define a "political compact," not merely in terms of the topic or type of the compact, but in terms of its function as a compact that tends to enlarge the power of some states at the expense of others. Under this definition, the National Popular Vote (NPV) is a political compact because it shifts political power among presidential electors across states. Third, I conclude that the Compact, which ostensibly designates the procedure that participating states will use to appoint their presidential electors, actually affects the political power of non-compacting states.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 6
Keywords: compact clause, national popular vote, political compact, political consent, electors, president, electionAccepted Paper Series
Date posted: April 3, 2012
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