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Teaching in the Lab: Financial Incentives in the Education Process


Christoph Helbach


University of Duisburg-Essen

Klemens Keldenich


University of Duisburg-Essen

April 2, 2012

Ruhr Economic Paper No. 328

Abstract:     
This study uses a laboratory experiment to analyze the effectiveness of performance based monetary incentives in the teaching process. The process of knowledge transmission is recreated using a video-stream. Four different teacher payment schemes are compared, three of which depend on the student‘s success. Furthermore, the experiment is done with two different subject pools: prospective teachers and regular students. Results indicate that prospective teachers do not react to monetary incentives in the given task. However, regular students do react in the expected way: Teachers transmit a significantly higher share of their knowledge when paid according to student performance.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 27

Keywords: education, monetary incentives, video analysis

JEL Classification: C91, D03, I21, J33

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Date posted: June 21, 2012  

Suggested Citation

Helbach, Christoph and Keldenich, Klemens, Teaching in the Lab: Financial Incentives in the Education Process (April 2, 2012). Ruhr Economic Paper No. 328. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2038274 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2038274

Contact Information

Christoph Helbach
University of Duisburg-Essen ( email )
Universitätsstr. 12
Essen, 45117
Germany
Klemens Keldenich (Contact Author)
University of Duisburg-Essen ( email )
Universitätsstr. 12
Essen, 45117
Germany
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