Abstract

 
 

References (32)



 


 



Consistent Price Systems and Arbitrage Opportunities of the Second Kind in Models with Transaction Costs


Emmanuel Lepinette-Denis


Université Paris-Dauphine - CEREMADE

Youri Kabanov


Universite de Franche-Comte; Russian Academy of Sciences (RAS) - Central Economics and Mathematics Institute

December 12, 2009

Finance Stochastics, Vol. 16, No. 1, 2012

Abstract:     
In contrast with the classical models of frictionless financial markets, market models with proportional transaction costs, even satisfying usual no-arbitrage properties, may admit arbitrage opportunities of the second kind. This means that there are self-financing portfolios with initial endowments laying outside the solvency region but ending inside. Such a phenomenon was discovered by M. Rasonyi in the discrete-time framework. In this note we consider a rather abstract continuous-time setting and prove necessary and sufficient conditions for the property which we call No Free Lunch of the 2nd Kind, NFL2. We provide a number of equivalent conditions elucidating, in particular, the financial meaning of the property B which appeared as an indispensable 'technical' hypothesis in previous papers on hedging (super-replication) of contingent claims under transaction costs. We show that it is equivalent to another condition on the 'richness' of the set of consistent price systems, close to the condition PCE introduced by Rasonyi. In the last section we deduce the Rasonyi theorem from our general result using specific features of discrete-time models.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 18

Keywords: transaction costs, arbitrage, no free lunch, consistent price systems, set-valued processes, Martingales

Accepted Paper Series


Download This Paper

Date posted: April 13, 2012  

Suggested Citation

Lepinette-Denis, Emmanuel and Kabanov, Youri, Consistent Price Systems and Arbitrage Opportunities of the Second Kind in Models with Transaction Costs (December 12, 2009). Finance Stochastics, Vol. 16, No. 1, 2012. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2038779

Contact Information

Emmanuel Lepinette-Denis (Contact Author)
Université Paris-Dauphine - CEREMADE ( email )
Place du Marechal de Lattre de Tassigny
Paris Cedex 16, 75775
France
Youri Kabanov
Universite de Franche-Comte ( email )
16 Route de Gray
Besancon Cedex, F-25030
France
Russian Academy of Sciences (RAS) - Central Economics and Mathematics Institute
47, Nakhimovsky prospect
Moscow, 117418
Russia
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 114
Downloads: 14
References:  32

© 2013 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright
This page was processed by apollo2 in 0.594 seconds