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Are Joint Audits Associated with Higher Audit Fees?


Paul André


ESSEC Business School and ESSEC-KPMG Financial Reporting Center

Géraldine Broye


EM Strasbourg Business School

Christopher K.M. Pong


Nottingham University Business School

Alain Schatt


University of Neuchâtel - Institute of Financial Analysis

January 31, 2013


Abstract:     
In its Green Paper on audit policy (October 2010), the European Commission suggested that joint audits might be a way of improving the audit market in Europe. However, some parties consider that joint audits are not an efficient solution because they would significantly increase audit fees paid by companies. We compare audit fees paid in 2007, 2008 and 2009 by listed companies in France, where joint audits are mandatory, with those paid by Italian and British companies. We find significantly higher audit fees in France after controlling for well documented auditor, client and engagement attributes and in particular for auditor switching and non-audit fees, which vary across countries. Theory suggests that audit fees in countries with high investor protection, like the UK, should be greater than those in countries with low investor protection like France and Italy. In our matched samples, audit fees are about 40% higher in France compared to either the UK or Italy. Further, higher audit fees are not paid for higher audit quality, we do not find differential levels of earnings management (a proxy for audit quality).

Number of Pages in PDF File: 42

Keywords: Joint Audits, Audit fees, Legal regime, France, UK, Italy

JEL Classification: M40, K20, G38

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Date posted: April 12, 2012 ; Last revised: February 4, 2013

Suggested Citation

André, Paul, Broye, Géraldine, Pong, Christopher K.M. and Schatt, Alain, Are Joint Audits Associated with Higher Audit Fees? (January 31, 2013). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2039001 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2039001

Contact Information

Paul André (Contact Author)
ESSEC Business School and ESSEC-KPMG Financial Reporting Center ( email )
Av Bernard Hirsch
Cergy-Pontoise 95021
France
Géraldine Broye
EM Strasbourg Business School ( email )
PEGE
61 avenue de la Forêt Noire
Strasbourg, 67000
France
Christopher K.M. Pong
Nottingham University Business School ( email )
Jubilee Campus
Wollaton Rad
Nottingham, NG8 1BB
United Kingdom
01159515484 (Phone)
Alain Schatt
University of Neuchâtel - Institute of Financial Analysis ( email )
Avenue du 1er-Mars 26
Neuchâtel, 2000
Switzerland
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