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Bonus Payments, Hierarchy Levels, and Tenure: Theoretical Considerations and Empirical Evidence


Christian Grund


RWTH Aachen University - School of Economics and Business Administration; Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

Matthias Kräkel


University of Bonn - Economic Science Area; Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

Schmalenbach Business Review


affiliation not provided to SSRN

April 1, 2012

Schmalenbach Business Review, Vol. 64, April 2012, pp. 101-124

Abstract:     
We investigate two theoretical approaches that focus on bonuses as part of a firm’s long-term wage policy. The first approach argues that explicit bonuses serve as substitutes for implicit career concerns. The second claims that bonuses act as complements to an executive’s internal career. Our data show that throughout the whole chemical industry sector, bonus payments are mostly prevalent among the most senior executives and for management jobs rather than for jobs in research and development. The findings indicate that the two theoretical views are not mutually exclusive, but are both relevant in practice.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 24

Keywords: Bonuses, Career Concerns, Hierarchy Levels, Internal Careers, Tenure

JEL Classification: J31, J33, M51, M52

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Date posted: April 14, 2012  

Suggested Citation

Grund, Christian, Kräkel, Matthias and Business Review, Schmalenbach, Bonus Payments, Hierarchy Levels, and Tenure: Theoretical Considerations and Empirical Evidence (April 1, 2012). Schmalenbach Business Review, Vol. 64, April 2012, pp. 101-124. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2039226

Contact Information

Christian Grund
RWTH Aachen University - School of Economics and Business Administration ( email )
Aachen
Germany
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany
Matthias Kräkel
University of Bonn - Economic Science Area ( email )
Adenauerallee 24-42
BWLII
D-53113 Bonn
Germany
+49 228 73 92 11 (Phone)
+49 228 73 92 10 (Fax)
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany
Schmalenbach Business Review (Contact Author)
affiliation not provided to SSRN ( email )
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


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