Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2039749
 
 

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Reputation Management and the Disclosure of Earnings Forecasts


Anne Beyer


Stanford University - Graduate School of Business

Ronald A. Dye


Northwestern University - Department of Accounting Information & Management

December 16, 2011

Review of Accounting Studies, Forthcoming

Abstract:     
In this paper, managers differ from each other in terms of the probability that they are "forthcoming" (and disclose all the earnings forecasts they receive) or "strategic" (and disclose the earnings forecasts they receive only when it is in their self-interest to do so). Strategic managers choose whether to disclose their forecasts based on both the disclosure's effects on their firms' stock price and on their reputation among investors for being forthcoming.

Our findings include strategic managers can build a reputation for being forthcoming by disclosing unfavorable forecasts; managers' incentive to build a reputation for being forthcoming may be so strong that they disclose even the most negative forecasts; as managers become more concerned about their reputation: (a) the current price of the firm in the event the manager makes no forecast increases; (b) managers who have a high probability of behaving strategically (as forthcoming) in the future issue forecasts more (less) often in the present.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 35

Keywords: Reputation, Forecasts, Voluntary Disclosure, Valuation

JEL Classification: D82, M41

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Date posted: April 15, 2012  

Suggested Citation

Beyer, Anne and Dye, Ronald A., Reputation Management and the Disclosure of Earnings Forecasts (December 16, 2011). Review of Accounting Studies, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2039749

Contact Information

Anne Beyer (Contact Author)
Stanford University - Graduate School of Business ( email )
518 Memorial Way
Stanford, CA 94305-5015
United States

Ronald A. Dye
Northwestern University - Department of Accounting Information & Management ( email )
2001 Sheridan Road
Evanston, IL 60208
United States
847-491-2663 (Phone)
847-467-1202 (Fax)
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