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Control of Finance as a Prerequisite for Successful Monetary Policy: A
Reinterpretation of Henry Simons’s 'Rules Versus Authorities in Monetary Policy'


Thorvald Grung Moe


Norges Bank; Levy Institute

April 16, 2012

Levy Economics Institute of Bard College Working Paper No. 713

Abstract:     
Henry Simons’s 1936 article “Rules versus Authorities in Monetary Policy” is a classical reference in the literature on central bank independence and rule-based policy. A closer reading of the article reveals a more nuanced policy prescription, with significant emphasis on the need to control short-term borrowing; bank credit is seen as highly unstable, and price level controls, in Simons’s view, are not be possible without limiting banks’ ability to create money by extending loans. These elements of Simons’s theory of money form the basis for Hyman P. Minsky’s financial instability hypothesis. This should not come as a surprise, as Simons was Minsky’s teacher at the University of Chicago in the late 1930s. I review the similarities between their theories of financial instability and the relevance of their work for the current discussion of macroprudential tools and the conduct of monetary policy. According to Minsky and Simons, control of finance is a prerequisite for successful monetary policy and economic stabilization.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 15

Keywords: Monetary Policy, Financial Stability, Narrow Banking, Financial Regulation

JEL Classification: B22, E42, E52, G28

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Date posted: April 16, 2012  

Suggested Citation

Moe, Thorvald Grung , Control of Finance as a Prerequisite for Successful Monetary Policy: A Reinterpretation of Henry Simons’s 'Rules Versus Authorities in Monetary Policy' (April 16, 2012). Levy Economics Institute of Bard College Working Paper No. 713. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2040882 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2040882

Contact Information

Thorvald Grung Moe (Contact Author)
Norges Bank ( email )
P.O. Box 1179
Oslo, N-0107
Norway
47-22316097 (Phone)

Levy Institute ( email )
Blithewood
Annandale-on-Hudson, NY 12504-5000
United States
1-845-758-7732 (Phone)
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