Undressing the CEO: Disclosing Private, Material Matters of Public Company Executives
Tom C. W. Lin
Temple University - James E. Beasley School of Law
11 University of Pennsylvania Journal of Business Law 383 (2009)
Disclosing material private matters of public company executives is a difficult and complex but sometimes necessary act. Advocates that favor more disclosure and advocates that favor more privacy both have many legitimate arguments and concerns. This article argues that when viewed in the context of contemporary capital markets, the enhanced role of the executive, and the modern media, additional disclosure from executives about material, private matters is desirable. In support of this argument, this article proposes a principle-based approach for executive disclosure that affords companies and executives reasonable deference on what to disclose and how to disclose it, while simultaneously strengthening regulatory safeguards for the investing public with minimal compliance burdens.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 44
Keywords: corporate law, securities regulations, disclosure, privacy, executive, corporate governanceAccepted Paper Series
Date posted: April 16, 2012 ; Last revised: October 8, 2013
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