Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2041154
 
 

References (65)



 


 



Assuring Adequate Deterrence in Tort: A Public Good Experiment


Theodore Eisenberg


Cornell University - Law School

Christoph Engel


Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods; University of Bonn - Faculty of Law & Economics; Universität Osnabrück - Faculty of Law

April 1, 2012

MPI Collective Goods Preprint, No. 2012/7
Cornell Legal Studies Research Paper No. 12-27

Abstract:     
To explore damage rules’ deterrent effect, we use a public good experiment to tailor allowable punishment to rules used in actual civil litigation. The experimental treatments are analogous to: damages limited to harm to an individual litigant, damages limited to harm to a group available in aggregate litigation, such as class actions, and damages allowed beyond actual harm to victims, such as punitive damages. The treatment with damages limited to harm to an individual does not prevent the deterioration in cooperation over time commonly found in public good experiments without punishment or with too low punishment. In the class action damages treatment, cooperation is stable over time. In the damages-beyond-harm treatment, cooperation approaches the optimal level, but concerns of socially unjust punishment arise. In all treatments, a money maximizing agent would be expected to completely free ride and make no contribution to the public good. Our results can thus not be explained by an incentive effect. Rather we find that social preferences interact with the severity of sanctions, even if imposing the sanction is not altruistic, but instead financially benefits the sanctioning authority. The results persist in a variation of the three treatments in which the player imposing damages has the option to not retain them for herself but to have them forfeited with no benefit to her. We can therefore rule out that the beneficial effect of sanctions hinges on the participants knowing that the player imposing sanctions cannot intend to enrich herself. The methodology we develop could be used to assess the social welfare benefit of many damages rules, such as treble damages in antitrust cases and caps on damages common in medical malpractice cases and punitive damages cases.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 51

Keywords: deterrence, public good experiment, class actions, tort, damages, punitive damages

JEL Classification: K13, K4, C73, K0

working papers series


Download This Paper

Date posted: April 18, 2012  

Suggested Citation

Eisenberg, Theodore and Engel, Christoph, Assuring Adequate Deterrence in Tort: A Public Good Experiment (April 1, 2012). MPI Collective Goods Preprint, No. 2012/7; Cornell Legal Studies Research Paper No. 12-27. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2041154 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2041154

Contact Information

Theodore Eisenberg
Cornell University - Law School ( email )
524 College Ave
Myron Taylor Hall
Ithaca, NY 14853
United States
607-255-6477 (Phone)
607-255-7193 (Fax)
Christoph Engel (Contact Author)
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods ( email )
Kurt-Schumacher-Str. 10
D-53113 Bonn, 53113
Germany
+049 228 914160 (Phone)
+049 228 9141655 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.coll.mpg.de/engel.html

University of Bonn - Faculty of Law & Economics
Postfach 2220
D-53012 Bonn
Germany
University of Osnabrueck - Faculty of Law
c/o Prof. Dr. Schneider
Osnabruck, D-49069
Germany
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 797
Downloads: 133
Download Rank: 126,599
References:  65

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo4 in 0.344 seconds