Crisis, Rationality, and Institutions: How Communities Cope with Unpleasant Surprises without Collapsing
Roger D. Congleton
West Virginia University - Department of Economics; George Mason University - Center for Study of Public Choice; George Mason University - Department of Economics
April 25, 2012
PERC Research Paper No. 12/6
Abstract:
This paper develops a model of crisis and collapse, which is used to analyze the relative survivability of communities with alternative political institutions. The analysis suggests that communities with relatively democratic, decentralized, and flexible crisis managemen systems tend to do better than those with rigid, centralized crisis management systems because they are less likely to deplete the social reserves necessary for survival in the long run. Existential problems examined include both natural shocks and policy mistakes.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 38
working papers series
Suggested Citation
Congleton, Roger D., Crisis, Rationality, and Institutions: How Communities Cope with Unpleasant Surprises without Collapsing (April 25, 2012). PERC Research Paper No. 12/6. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2041617 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2041617
