Abstract

 


 



Risk Arbitrage and the Information Content of Hedge Fund Trading


Charles Cao


Pennsylvania State University

Bradley A. Goldie


University of Kansas

Bing Liang


University of Massachusetts at Amherst - Department of Finance & Operations Management; China Academy of Financial Research (CAFR)

Lubomir Petrasek


Federal Reserve Board; Pennsylvania State University

April 19, 2012


Abstract:     
We study the implementation of risk (or merger) arbitrage by hedge funds and other institutional arbitrageurs and document the increasing role of hedge funds in the takeover process. Using institutional arbitrageurs’ reported portfolio holdings, we find evidence of superior performance by hedge fund arbitrageurs compared to non-hedge fund institutional arbitrageurs. Specifically, within the context of merger arbitrage, hedge funds significantly outperform other institutional arbitrageurs by 4% annually on a risk-adjusted basis. The superior performance does not reflect hedge fund managers’ ability to predict or affect the outcome of merger and acquisition deals; rather, our findings suggest that it is attributed to hedge fund managers’ ability to avoid deals with the largest downside when offer deals are withdrawn. Hedge fund and non-hedge fund investments in target shares are both associated with a higher probability of deal completion and shorter deal duration.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 46

Keywords: Hedge fund holdings, risk arbitrageur, mergers and acquisitions

JEL Classification: G23, G34

working papers series


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Date posted: April 20, 2012  

Suggested Citation

Cao, Charles, Goldie, Bradley A., Liang, Bing and Petrasek, Lubomir, Risk Arbitrage and the Information Content of Hedge Fund Trading (April 19, 2012). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2042744 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2042744

Contact Information

Charles Cao
Pennsylvania State University ( email )
Department of Finance
Smeal College of Business
University Park, PA 16802
United States
814-865-7891 (Phone)
814-865-3362 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.personal.psu.edu/qxc2/cao.html
Bradley A. Goldie (Contact Author)
University of Kansas ( email )
Lawrence, KS 66045
United States
Bing Liang
University of Massachusetts at Amherst - Department of Finance & Operations Management ( email )
Amherst, MA 01003
United States
China Academy of Financial Research (CAFR)
1954 Huashan Road
Shanghai P.R.China, 200030
China

Lubomir Petrasek
Federal Reserve Board ( email )
20th Street and Constitution Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20551
United States
Pennsylvania State University ( email )
Smeal College of Business
University Park, PA 16802
United States
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


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