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Resources or Power? Implications of Social Networks on Compensation and Firm Performance


Joanne Horton


London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - Department of Accounting and Finance

Yuval Millo


London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - Accounting Department

George Serafeim


Harvard University - Harvard Business School

April/May 2012

Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Vol. 39, Issue 3-4, pp. 399-426, 2012

Abstract:     
Using a sample of 4,278 listed UK firms, we construct a social network of directorship-interlocks that comprises 31,495 directors. We use social capital theory and techniques developed in social network analysis to measure a director's connectedness and investigate whether this connectedness is associated with their compensation level and their firm's overall performance. We find connectedness is positively associated with compensation and with the firm's future performance. The results do not support the view that executive and outside directors use their connections to extract economic rents. Rather the company compensates these individuals for the resources these better connections provide to the firm.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 28

Keywords: Corporate governance, compensation, board of directors, social networks, corporate performance

Accepted Paper Series


Date posted: April 21, 2012  

Suggested Citation

Horton, Joanne, Millo, Yuval and Serafeim, George, Resources or Power? Implications of Social Networks on Compensation and Firm Performance (April/May 2012). Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Vol. 39, Issue 3-4, pp. 399-426, 2012. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2042952 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5957.2011.02276.x

Contact Information

Joanne Horton (Contact Author)
London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - Department of Accounting and Finance ( email )
Houghton Street
London WC2A 2AE
United Kingdom
Yuval Millo
London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - Accounting Department ( email )
Houghton Street
London WC2A 2AE
United Kingdom
HOME PAGE: http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/accounting/facultyAndStaff/profiles/Millo.htm
George Serafeim
Harvard University - Harvard Business School ( email )
381 Morgan Hall
Boston, MA 02163
United States
HOME PAGE: http://drfd.hbs.edu/fit/public/facultyInfo.do?facInfo=ovr&facId=15705
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