Google's Stock-Split Plan Would Replace Stewardship with Dictatorship
Simon C. Y. Wong
Northwestern University School of Law; London School of Economics
April 27, 2012
Harvard Business Review Online, April 2012
Google recently announced that it would seek to cement its founders' control through the issuance of non-voting stock. In this commentary, I argue that while I am supportive of strong stewardship by Google's founders, its proposal would excessively entrench control and should therefore be rejected.
This article employs a comparative perspective, drawing on the trend in developed and emerging markets to eliminate or reduce the severity of multiple share classes. In addition, I distinguish Google's proposal from the discussions in the UK on granting long-term shareholders enhanced voting rights.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 2
Keywords: Corporate governance, non-voting stock, multiple-share classes, entrenchment
JEL Classification: G32, G34Accepted Paper Series
Date posted: April 22, 2012 ; Last revised: May 7, 2012
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