Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2044530
 
 

Citations (1)



 


 



Unification of Commercial Law: The Role of the Dominant Economy


Arnald J. Kanning


Independent

August 17, 2016


Abstract:     
The economy of a state (‘dependent state’) may depend relatively more upon the economy of another, less dependent, state (‘dominant state’) than vice versa. This paper explains why the ‘dominant economy’ can wield leverage over the issue of which legal rules to include in a uniform commercial law. In the preparation of a uniform commercial law, the ‘dependent state’ looks more likely to make the tradeoff between increased interstate economic activity and applying less-preferred legal rules. Within the conceptual framework of historical and comparative institutional analysis (HCIA), an empirical study is offered of several well-known attempts to unify (and codify) divergent bodies of commercial (common) law in the past two centuries.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 38

Keywords: New Institutional Economics, Transaction Cost Economics, Contracting Institutions, Commercial Law, Unification of Law, Uniform State Law, Cooperative Federalism, Coordination, Economic Dominance.

JEL Classification: D61, D63, D72, H70, H73


Open PDF in Browser Download This Paper

Date posted: April 24, 2012 ; Last revised: August 18, 2016

Suggested Citation

Kanning, Arnald J., Unification of Commercial Law: The Role of the Dominant Economy (August 17, 2016). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2044530 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2044530

Contact Information

Arnald J. Kanning (Contact Author)
Independent ( email )
No Address Available
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 351
Downloads: 33
Citations:  1

© 2016 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollobot1 in 0.187 seconds