Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2045054
 
 

Footnotes (21)



 


 



Does the Individual Mandate Coerce?


Raphael Boleslavsky


University of Miami - School of Business

Sergio J. Campos


University of Miami - School of Law

April 23, 2012

University of Miami Law Review, Vol. 68, No. 1, 2013
University of Miami Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2012-16

Abstract:     
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act includes an individual mandate which penalizes individuals who do not purchase health insurance. Critics of the individual mandate, including a majority of justices on the Supreme Court, contend that Congress cannot use its Commerce Clause power to coerce individuals to buy a product. Supporters concede that the mandate coerces but argue that it is otherwise permissible under the Commerce Clause. This Article questions whether the individual mandate coerces. It uses a simple economic model to show that, under certain conditions, the individual mandate induces insurers to sell health insurance at a price each individual would voluntarily pay. Accordingly, the Article concludes that the premise underlying the debate over the constitutionality of the individual mandate under the Commerce Clause should not be taken for granted.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 18

Keywords: individual mandate, patient protection and affordable care act, commerce clause, necessary and proper clause, health care, insurance

JEL Classification: I11, K32

Accepted Paper Series





Download This Paper

Date posted: April 23, 2012 ; Last revised: December 16, 2013

Suggested Citation

Boleslavsky, Raphael and Campos, Sergio J., Does the Individual Mandate Coerce? (April 23, 2012). University of Miami Law Review, Vol. 68, No. 1, 2013; University of Miami Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2012-16. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2045054 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2045054

Contact Information

Raphael Boleslavsky
University of Miami - School of Business ( email )
P.O. Box 248126
Florida
Coral Gables, FL 33124
United States
Sergio J. Campos (Contact Author)
University of Miami - School of Law ( email )
P.O. Box 248087
Coral Gables, FL 33146
United States
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 695
Downloads: 101
Download Rank: 161,728
Footnotes:  21

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo5 in 0.359 seconds