The End Of History For Corporate Law
Yale Law School; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
Harvard Law School; European Corporate Governance Institute
Yale Law School Working Paper No. 235; NYU Working Paper No. 013; Harvard Law School Discussion Paper No. 280; Yale SOM Working Paper No. ICF - 00-09
Despite the apparent divergence in institutions of governance, share ownership, capital markets, and business culture across developed economies, the basic law of the corporate form has already achieved a high degree of uniformity, and continued convergence is likely. A principal reason for convergence is a widespread normative consensus that corporate managers should act exclusively in the economic interests of shareholders, including noncontrolling shareholders. This consensus on a shareholder-oriented model of the corporation results in part from the failure of alternative models of the corporation, including the manager-oriented model that evolved in the U.S. in the 1950's and 60's, the labor-oriented model that reached its apogee in German co-determination, and the state-oriented model that until recently was dominant in France and much of Asia. Other reasons for the new consensus include the competitive success of contemporary British and American firms, the growing influence worldwide of the academic disciplines of economics and finance, the diffusion of share ownership in developed countries, and the emergence of active shareholder representatives and interest groups in major jurisdictions. Since the dominant corporate ideology of shareholder primacy is unlikely to be undone, its success represents the "end of history" for corporate law.
The ideology of shareholder primacy is likely to press all major jurisdictions toward similar rules of corporate law and practice. Although some differences may persist as a result of institutional or historical contingencies, the bulk of legal development worldwide will be toward a standard legal model of the corporation. For the most part, this development will enhance the efficiency of corporate laws and practices. In some cases, however, jurisdictions may converge on inefficient rules, as when the universal rule of limited shareholder liability permits shareholders to externalize the costs of corporate torts.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 36
JEL Classification: F20, G34, K22
Date posted: March 10, 2000
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