Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2045638
 


 



Separation of Powers or Division of Power?


Jeremy Waldron


New York University School of Law

April 24, 2012

NYU School of Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 12-20

Abstract:     
The rationale of the separation of powers is often elided with the rationale of checks and balances and with the rationale of the dispersal of power generally in a constitutional system. This paper however focuses resolutely on the functional sepaartion of powers in what MJC Vile called its "pure form". Rexeamining the theories of Locke, Montesquieu, and Madison, the paper seeks to recover (amidst all their tautologies and evasions) a genuine case in favor of this principle. The paper argues that the rationale of the separation of powers is closely related to that of the rule of law: it is partly a matter of the distinct integrity of each of the separated institutions (courts, legislature, and administration). But above all, it is a matter of articulated governance (as contrasted with compressed undifferentiated exercises of power).

Number of Pages in PDF File: 34

Keywords: constitutionalism, constitutions, courts, legislature, Madison, Montesquieu, rule of law, separation of powers

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Date posted: April 24, 2012 ; Last revised: May 9, 2012

Suggested Citation

Waldron, Jeremy, Separation of Powers or Division of Power? (April 24, 2012). NYU School of Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 12-20. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2045638 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2045638

Contact Information

Jeremy Waldron (Contact Author)
New York University School of Law ( email )
40 Washington Square South
New York, NY 10012-1099
United States
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